Five scenarios are considered: two optimistic scenarios, two medium scenarios and one pessimistic scenario. The scenarios are combinations of three mortality scenarios, two fertility scenarios and three migration scenarios. Results and a discussion of the differences between the scenarios are presented for 11 economic-geographic regions. The main findings of the scenario analysis are: (a) the population decline, which started in 1992, continues in all scenarios; (b) aging of the population reaches unprecedented levels; and (c) the spatial redistribution of the population out of Siberia to the European part of Russia, in particular the southern regions (North Caucasus and the Volga Region), continues. 0
INTRODUCTION
From an analysis of recent demographic changes in Russia, the following general trends emerge':
(4 (b) (c) (4 Increasing mortality since the 196Os, with a brief period of mortality decline in the second half of the 1980s and a rapid increase in the 1990s; Relatively stable fertility around two children per woman for many years, a sharp decline in fertility in the first half of the 1990s; Decrease in internal migration in the early 1990s with a slight recovery in 1994 and a continued recovery in 1995. Two characteristic patterns are observed: (i) outmigration from urban areas in the early 1990s for a few years followed by a slight reversal of the trend (urban population starts growing again), and (ii) substantial migration from the North and the Far East to the European part of Russia, in particular its southern part, and to Ukraine. Continued outmigration from former republics in Central Asia and the Caucasus.
In this paper, we look into the future. Based on the study of historical and recent trends and on expert opinions about what changes may occur, scenarios are developed that present realistic and internally consistent views on what the future may look like. These scenarios are not forecasts, i.e. they do not represent the most likely future. They represent possible futures based on extensive analysis of trends and changes that may be expected on theoretical grounds. Disaster scenarios that may result from natural or man-made catastrophes are omitted because an objective assessment of the demographic consequences is beyond the scope of the current investigation.
It is expected, however, that mortality will increase, fertility may decline further (at least for a period) and the level and direction of migration will depend on the nature to that end, a new unit has been established. The calculation methodology was formulated in the IY~OS.~ Forecasting assumptions are formulated in terms of changes in age-specific rates of mortality and fertility (ratios of rates). Migration perspectives are estimated using net migration by area for each year of the forecasting period. A total of five scenarios arc rcportcd in this study. They are combinations of assumptions about future trends in mortality, fertility and migration. Three letters identify each scenario. The first denotes the assumption about mortality and fertility; the second refers to cxtcrnal migration; and the third to internal migration. Three combinations of mortality-fertility trends arc considered. They are labeled "optimistic." "pessimistic" and "medium": 
THE SCENARIOS
The mortality scenarios are based on the analysis by Andreev (forthcoming). For a detailed description of the mortality outlook, the reader is referred to that publication. The scenario variable to describe the mortality trend is the lift cxpcctancy at birth [e(O)]. In the pessimistic scenario, it is assumed that the stagnation in the economic sphere continues.
Life expectancy continues to decline following the trend of the past 30 years (since 1965). The optimistic scenario assumes a relatively rapid end of the crisis. Mortalitv is assumed to decrease at a rate that was typIcal for West Europe in the 1950s~ lY6Os. United Nations assumed a similar t-ate of mortality decline in their projections for countries in transition.
To translate changes in life expectancy at birth [e(O)] into changes in age-specific rates of death, we used the Brass logit model with one paramctcr (intercept).
The intercept is derived from e(0) by. an iterative procedure'; the slope of the rcgrcsslon equation is assumed to remain constant at one.
A special feature of mortality in Russia is the large difference between male and female life expectancy.
In 1996, the difference was about 12.7 years [e(O) was 59.8 for males and 72.5 for femalcs]. In some areas the difference is 14.5 years (e.g., Novgorod
The results of the scenarios show that the difference at the end of projection horizon is 17 years in the pessimistic scenario and 10 years in the optimistic scenario.
(ii) Fertility
The fertility scenarios arc based on the analysis by Bondarskaya and Darsky (forthcoming).
For a detailed description of the fertility outlook, the reader is referred to that paper. The fertility scenarios were prepared for this report by Bondarskaya and K'arkhova of the Department of Demography, ISES. In order to determine the fertility scenarios, the following information was used: fertility trends from vital statistics; two indicators of the Micro-Census of February 1994: expected number of children for youngest cohorts (18-2')) and completed fertility of all cohorts (18-44);
and illegitimate births from the vita1 statistics.
In the pessimistic scenario, the socioeconomic crisis continues and the TFR continues to decline and stabilizes at a very low level. It is assumed that fertility tends to a minimum level, below which it cannot fall. The minimum level TFR is 0.8 for urban areas and 1.2 for rural areas. Some rural areas have already a TFR of around 1.2. For these areas, it is assumed that fertility increases slightly in the future. It is further assumed that regional fertility differences will decline, i.e. Russia becomes more homogeneous with respect to the reproductive behavior of the families.
In the optimistic scenario, it is assumed that the fertility decline in past years is entirely due to postponed births. Therefore, WC may expect fertility to increase at the end of the crisis. Fertility is assumed to first increase relatively rapidly from its level of 1.4 in I994 (due to postponed births) and to stabilize at a TFR of 1.9 in 2020-2025. This scenario is based on the Micro-Census: it is assumed that by the year 2000, the TFR will reach a level that is equal to the average expected number of children for all cohorts (women aged 18-44 at time of MicroCensus).
In other words. the maximum completed fertility of young cohorts will be the same as the expected fertility of all cohorts in the 1994 Micro-Census.
In the medium variant, it is assumed that in 2000-2005 economic crises will come to an end. number of Russians in former republics in lYY4 times emigration rates. The total number of migrants from other former republics to Russia depends on number of Russians. That seems realistic since the majority of migrants will be Russians or members of Russian families.
Today, there is very little migration out of Russia (in 1994 the migration efficiency< is 48%; most migration is repatriation). When this repatriation is over, the migration efficiency is expected to decline to 8%', which is comparable to the level in 1989, i.e. before the dissolution of the USSR (1991). In the HIGH scenario, the efficiency will remain at 48% and in the LOW scenario, it will change linearly from the current value of 48% to 8%.
(d) Rcgimzulizatiotz
In order to determine the regional mortality scenarios, WC compared the mortality trends in Russia and the regions. The trend was investigated separately for children (O-4) and adults using the life tables for the areas (ohlusts/kruy). Particular attention was devoted to the infant mortality (IMR) and the life expectancy at age 1 [e(l)]. These indicators for Russia and the areas were compared.
Two situations were distinguished: the trend in the area is comparable to the trend in Russia; and the regional trend differs considerably from the national trend. In the first situation, the mortality trend for Russia as a whole was used but the IMR and e(1) were substituted for the regional values. The value in 2025 was determined assuming parallel development with Russia. Rural-urban differences were taken into account (life tables were calculated for rural and urban areas). The results were aggregated to the level of economic-geographic region to prepare the scenarios. In case of regional peculiarities, two cases were distinguished.
-If there was no recent increase in mortality, we assume mortality to be stable during the entire projection horizon (to 2025) in the pessimistic scenario; in the optimistic scenario, mortality is assumed to decline parallel to the decline in Russia (this case applies to rural areas of some republics of North Caucasus). -In case no real dynamics were observed we ignore regional dynamics and assume that the mortality trend of neighboring regions applies (this is the case of Magadan, Chucki, Kamchatka, and a few other areas).
In total, not more than 10 areas were identified as having peculiarities in their mortality trend.
One could expect a more rapid decline in fertility in areas with high illegitimate fertility, since they are further in the Second Demographic Transition (the North and Far East Regions:
Perm, Magadan, Kamchatka, Irkutsk ohlust, Buryatia and Komi republics). In these areas, fertility decline will be more rapid and trend inversions arc less likely. The trend in TFR was derived from age-specific fertility rates, which are calculated annually using the numbers of births from the vital statistics and estimates of the female population.
The estimates are based on the census population and vital events in years following the census.
(iii) Miption
In the first internal migration scenario (A), the level of migration and the direction (destination probabilities) are considered to remain stable. The migration matrix for 1994 was used for both sexes combined and all ages combined. The probability of moving from one area to another area within live years must be determined because the projection is in five-year intervals. The five-year probability was determined by raising the one-year migration probability matrix to the power five. The denominator was the number of residents in an area on January 1. 1994. To obtain the number of migrations during 1995-99, we multiplied the population on January 1, 1995 by the migration probability. Analogously, the number of migrants for each five-year period during 1995-2025 was obtained. During simulation. this procedure resulted in a negative population for one area (Magadan). This area experienced a major outmigration in 1994. To avoid a negative population.
outmigration was assumed to bc less than observed in 1994.
In the second internal migration scenario (C) mobility is assumed to increase. starting in the year 2000. The general mobility level. expressed as the probability of departure from each area, is increased by 50% to obtain the probability in 2020-2024. The basis for this assumption is that the current mobility level is very low and a 5OV increase would yield a mobility level that is comparable to the level before 1989. Because the current rate of outmigration from some areas is very high, the assumption of a 50% increase cannot be applied to all areas. For instance, outmigration from the North and the East is currently very high leading to a decline of the population.
It is assumed that the decline is temporary and associated with the economic situation. When the economy recovers, the North and the East will also recover and probably more rapidly than some other areas in the country because of the location of resources. It is assumed, therefore, that with increasing mobility. the population decline in the North and the East is compensated by an increase in immigration from other areas of Russia. The "pull" factor is increased to reach a lcvcl of immigration that is sufficient to compensate part of the population decrease in 1992-99. In this scenario, it is further assumed that population does not move from industrial centers (Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Novgorod).
In the third internal migration scenario (B), the level and direction of migration is between (A) and (C), except for Magadan. For Magadan, the migration cannot remain at the level of lY94 (30,000 of the 200,000 residents left Magadan in 1994) because the area would depopulate completely.
By iteration. it was assumed that: overall migration increases by 50%; losses in the East and the North are compensated;
and there is zero net migration for industrial centers. In addition, the migration matrix should remain as close as possible to the original (1994) migration matrix. Andreev (forthcoming) compares three matrices (1989, 1992 and 1994) . The matrix of 1992 was considered unrealistic (e.g., migration from large cities) and was therefore ignored. 
RESULTS
The five scenarios result in five sets of population projections.
Each set represents an alternative future, i.e. a trajectory based on specific assumptions about possible changes in mortality, fertility and migration. The range of alternatives represents a continuum of what we consider to be possible and it expresses the uncertaintics about the future. We do not know precisely what the future will look like. but we have a reasonable idea of what may be expected, provided the conditions do not change drastically.
The highlights of the results of the scenario analysis are:
The populution decline, which started in 1992. continues in all scenarios. The population of Russia reached its maximum on January 1. 1992 (148.3 million) and has declined since (147.6 in 1996), due to negative natural increase. The annual number of deaths exceeds the number of births by almost one million and the difference is fast increasing (220,000 in 1992, 750,000 in lYY3 and 893,000 in 1994). The positive migration (ii) balance, which increased from 176,000 in 1992 to 810,000 in 1994, and then declined to 502,000 in 1995,6 compensates a large part of the excess deaths over births but it cannot prevent the population from declining. Without the migration balance, which has been positive on a continuous basis since 1975, the population growth of Russia, which in the past 20 years (1975-95) was ll%, would have been 8% and the country would have had a net loss of 1.5 million people over 1992-94.
The expected population decline between 1995 and 2025 ranges from two million in an optimistic scenario (OLB) to 32 million in a pessimistic scenario (PHA), i.e. a decline by more than 20% in 30 years. The pessimistic scenario does not contain anything exceptional. It assumes a continuing fertility decline (TFR declines further from its current level of 1.3 to 1.05 in 2025) consistent with the expectation expressed by women in the 1994 Micro-Census, no changes in mortality for females and a continuing increase m mortality for males (life expectancy declines further from the current level of 57.6 to 54.0 in 2025; the decline is much less rapid than observed in recent years'). Agirrg of the population reaches unprccedented levels. The mean age of the population of Russia. which was 36 years in 19Y5, increases in all scenarios; in 2025 it reaches about 40 years in the optimistic scenario (low mortality, high fertility) and 42 years in the pessimistic scenario (high mortality, low fertility). The pattern of aging changes over time. Up to 2010, the increase in mean age is caused bv the decline of children (as a result of low fertility) and an increase in population of working age (15-5')). Beyond 2010. the 60+ population rises sharply and the mean age increases accordingly. In 1995. 22.5 million people were aged 60+, which is 17% of the population. up from 15% in 108'). Of these elderly, two-thirds (67%) are females and one-third are males (in 1989, 6Y% were females).
In 2025. the number of 60+ persons will be 28 million in the optimistic scenario (OLB). 61% of which will be females, and 22 million in the pessimistic scenario (PHA), with the female proportion at 56%. The female proportion in the 60+ population declines in all scenarios because of the (iii) (iv) normalization of the age structure. The low number of males 60+ (and particularly 70+) today is to be attributed to the losses during WWII." Associated with aging is the increase in okl-qe dependency ratio." In 1995. Russia had two persons of hO+ for cvcry seven persons of working age (15-59). The ratio will not change much in the next IS years and will even decline a little. But after 2010, it will increase rapidly to two 60+ for every six persons of working age in 2025 in the "pessimistic" scenario and to two 60+ for every five persons of working age in the "optimistic" scenario. The difference is due mainly to differences in mortality. The spatial redistribution of the population is determined largely by internal migration although regional differences in mortality and fertility are substantial."' The most significant redistribution of the population takes place in the stable internal migration scenario. In the PHA scenario, the share of the population living in the Far East economicgeographic region declines from 5.2%~ in 1995 to 3.5% in 2025 (the number of people in that region declines from 7.6 million to 4.1 million). The decline is attributed to the high recent outmigration, which is assumed to continue in the future. Note that the migration from China to the Far East (most illegal) was not accounted for. Zaianchkovskaya (1994) estimated the number of Chinese in the Far East at about one million. The North, North West and East Siberia economic-geographic regions see their share decline too, but less pronounced as the Far East. The population is redistributed to the European part of Russia, which gets 80% of the population of Russia, the largest increase being in the North Caucasus and the Volga Regions. In the high mobility scenarios (OLC and MHC), the share of the Far East Region increases, although marginally. This trend is related to the assumption that, with increased mobility, some of the population losses in the Far East since 1992, are compensated for by immigration.
(b) Further details
A first result is the development of the demographic parameters at the national level.
Recall that the hypothcscs that enter the scenarios were specified for each of the 79 areas (or clusters of areas). Regional differences in population dynamics change the weights the regional parameters receive in determining the parameters at the state level. Figure 1 shows the trajectory of the Total Fertility Rate (TFR) that results from the assumed trajectories at the regional level. For reference, the TFR is also given for 1980-95. For future periods, the TFR is shown for the mid-period of live-year periods (the projection interval is five years). The TFR of Russia remains below replacement level for the three fertility scenarios.
Mortality changes are summarized in Figure 2 . Figure 2 shows the changes in the malt and female lift expectancies at the national level implied in the assumed regional variations in mortality levels. The changes in the level of net migration are shown in Figure  3 . For 1990-94, net migration amounted at 326.000 per year on average. Because most migration is repatriation of Russians living in the other states of the former Soviet Union.
net migration is expected to decline to a level of 140,000 in the HIGH scenario and to minus 25,000 in the LOW scenario (i.e. a net outflow of 25.000 persons).
The impact of the various scenarios on the size of the population of Russia was highlighted above. The population numbers in Russia and each economic-geographic region for each scenario, are shown in Table I. The scenarios have a different impact on the age-sex composition of the population. The sex ratio of the population (number of males per 100 females) is expected to decline in all scenarios from its current level of 88. The decline is negligible in the optimistic scenario but is large in the pessimistic scenario, associated with the assumption of relatively stable mortalitv for females and a continued increase in mortality for males. In the worst case, the sex ratio declines to 78 in 2025, which implies that males constitute only 44% of the population and females 56%.
Aging is an important feature of most populations of the world today. Russia is no exception. Because of the high male mortality at adult ages, however. aging is less rapid than in some other countries. The extent of aging may be summarized by the mean age of the population. The mean age increases from its current level of 36 years to close to 40 years in the optimistic scenario and more than 42 years in the pessimistic scenario. In the Central and North West Regions, the mean age is already relatively high (38) and continues to increase to more than 43 years in the pessimistic scenario. The youngest In 1995, the TFR of the region was the highest in the country (1.7) reaching levels of 2.6 in the Republic of Dagestan, which are considerably higher than the TFR in other regions, including the regions of the Far East and East Siberia (except the Republic of Tuva with a TFR of 2.5 in lY%)." The relatively young population in the Far East and East Siberia may be attributed to the emigration of older people (at retirement due to harsh living conditions), whereas the relatively young population in the North Caucasus is due to the higher than average fertility.
A common indicator of aging is the old-age dependency ratio. The trend is consistent with the trend in the 60+ population.
In 1095 the ratio was 0.27. It remains around that level up to 2010 and increases rapidly afterward to reach a level between 0.36 and 0.38 depending on the scenario.
Whereas the turning point in the old-age dependency ratio occurs in 2010, the turning point in the total dependency ratio occurs five years earlier. in 2005. This trend is associated with the combined trend in the O-14 and 60+ population
The regional diversity is very significant. In 19%. the ratio varied from 0.15 in the Far East Region to 0.37 in the Central Region. Differences arc expected to remain. The value in 2025 is expected to vary between 0.26 and 0.38 in the Far East Region and between 0.42 and 0.50 in the Central Region. These regional differences will require differential policies on infrastructure and social security.
The most detailed information on aging is contained in the age pyramids. Figures 4-6 show the age pyramids of the population for Russia and two extreme economic-geographic regions in 1995 and the population in 2025 associated with the different scenarios.
In the pessimistic scenarios the number of children decreases drastically (see, e.g., scenario PHA, which is characterized by high mortality, low fertility and relatively high immigration from other states of the former Soviet Union). The share of 60+ population remains more or less at the current level up to 2005, but increases sharply afterward. The increase is exceptionally pronounced in the Far East, where the number of 60+ more than doubles in the optimistic scenario.
A significant observation is the substantial increase in the net migration rates in the North Region. in East Siberia and the Far East Region in all scenarios except in the PHA scenario. The pattern is consistent with the assumed change in net migration: the PHA scenario is the only one with a stable internal migration pattern, i.e. a pattern that is characterized by a continued outmigrations from these regions. The high mobility pattern (C) and, to a lesser extent, the medium pattern (B), signify a turnaround of net migration for these regions to compensate for the population losses in the years after 1992. In the PHA scenario, the Far East loses close to 100,000 people every year up to the year 2000 and loses more than 70,000 every year during the following five years; the losses diminish afterward but they still reach 44,000 every year during 2020-2024. In the most optimistic scenario (high mobility), the Far East becomes a region with low outmigrations and substantial immigration, and gains 126,000 migrants every year during [2020] [2021] [2022] [2023] [2024] Table 3 ). In Table  the 
CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Russia has a shrinking population. During 1995-2025, the number of people is expected to decline by two million in the optimistic scenario and 32 million in the pessimistic scenario. Low fertility is the major reason for the decline. If future fertility occurs according to the expectations revealed by women in the 1994 MicroCensus, and mortality change would not be much different from what it has been over the past years, the population in 2025 would be 28 million less than the 148 million today. In 2025, Russia is expected to have from 20 to more than 50% fewer children than today, depending on the scenario.
The decline in the population of working age is expected to be between 14 and 25%. The size of the elderly (60+) population increases, however. In 1995. 22 million people were aged 60+; in 2025 the number is expected to be between 22 and 28 million. Most of the increase takes place after 2010.
The spatial redistribution of the population of Russia, which was initiated during recent years, is expected to continue. 0.24 -1.14 -2.55 ~ X. 25 -10.50 in which the development of large parts of Siberia is dependent on "New Russians" or migrant labor. Russia has the advantage that it can learn from the experiences of countries in the Middle East, North America, and Europe. Depending on the speed of development of Siberia, the population composition may change significantly.
Even with substantial immigration, the greying of Russia will continue. Given that the economic base for a comprehensive social security program will be lacking for decades, the elderly will need to manage (e.g., work longer) and will continue to depend on their children for financial support. Given the health status of the elderly, an increase in the age at retirement may not be an option.
The family remains the best social security program Russia has and will have for years to come. Policy makers should cherish the family as the basic unit of social and economic support, and avoid the road of excessive individualization that some countries in the West have followed. At the same time, a social security policy should be developed alongside an economic growth policy to assure harmonious development into the 21st century. 2. It was Lenin's view that the country could only be held together when the different peoples had some autonomy.
3. The model being used is described by Pobedina (1966).
The value of the intercept is determined
such that the life expectancy estimated from the survival probabilities predicted by the model is equal to the observed life expectancy.
The migration
efficiency is the ratio between the net migration and the sum of immigration and outmigration (see Andreev, forthcoming). The migration efficiency was 8% in 1989. 17% in 1990, 10% in 1991 and jumped to 48% in 1994. 6. Most of the balance is related to migration from the other states of the former Soviet Union. The migration balance with the states of the former Soviet Union was 914,000 in 1994 and 612,000 in 1995.
7. During 1990-94, the life expectancy of males declined more than six years (from 63.8 to 57.6). In some regions, the decline was much more rapid. For instance, in the Republic of Karelia, which borders Finland, the life expectancy of males declined from 63.7 in 1989-90 to 54.9 in 1994. During the same period, the life expectancy of women declined from 74.5 to 69.0.
8. The age pyramid of some regions (e.g.. Perm, included in North) shows a near absence of males at ages 70+.
9. The retirement age is 60 for males and 55 for females. The Demographic Yearbook publishes the share of the old-age dependent population: males 60+ and females 55+. Today, many women and men work beyond retirement age. A recent law permits the combination of pension and income from work.
10. In 1994, the lowest life expectancy was recorded in Tuva (48.9 for males and 62.9 for females); the highest life expectancy was in Dagestan (65.5 for males and 75.0 for females).
11. The TFR of the Chechen Republic is not given in The Demographic Yearbook. Until January 1, 1994, the Chechen and Ingush republics were combined. It is likely that the figure for Chechen does not differ much from the TFR in Ingush Republic, which was 2.9 in 1989-90 and is currently estimated at 2.7.
